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Corporate Tax Aggressiveness and Insider Trading 
 
Abstract: We examine the association between corporate tax aggressiveness and the profitability 
of insider trading under the assumption that insider trading profits reflect managerial opportunism. 
We document that insider purchase profitability, but not sales profitability, is significantly higher 
on average in more tax aggressive firms. We also find that the positive association between tax 
aggressiveness and insider purchase profitability is attenuated for firms with more effective 
monitoring and is accentuated for firms with a more opaque information environment. In addition, 
we provide empirical evidence that tax aggressiveness is significantly associated with greater 
insider sales volume in the fiscal year prior to a stock price crash. Finally, we find that the 
association between tax aggressiveness and insider purchase profitability weakens after the 
introduction of FIN 48, consistent with the increased transparency of tax positions under the new 
disclosure requirement reducing insiders’ information advantage and hence their ability to profit 
from insider trading. To the extent that insider trading profits reflect managerial opportunism, our 
results are consistent with managers exploiting the opacity arising from tax aggressive activities 
to extract rent from shareholders, particularly those who sold their shares to the managers. Our 
findings are particularly important in light of the number of studies relying on the agency view of 
tax avoidance to develop arguments or to draw inferences. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent studies advance the view that complementarities exist between tax avoidance and 
managerial rent extraction (e.g., Desai 2004; Desai and Dharmapala 2006; Desai et al. 2007). In 
particular, Desai (2004) provides examples of high-profile cases of tax avoidance – at Enron, Tyco 
and Xerox – that illustrate how the incentive to increase reported earnings via tax planning are 
linked to earnings manipulation and managerial malfeasance. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) 
develop a model that assumes that managers use tax avoidance to mask their rent extraction, partly 
because of the operational complexity that arises from complex tax avoidance activities. Despite 
this agency view being widely cited in both the finance and accounting literature (e.g., Chen et al. 
2010; Kim et al. 2011), whether managers use tax avoidance activities to extract rents from 
shareholders and the mechanisms through which they do so are unclear and not well established. 
As Armstrong et al. (2015, p.3) note, “…the precise channels through which managers extract (or 
personally benefit from) the rents that are generated from tax avoidance are not clear. Moreover, 
there is limited empirical evidence that managers do, in fact, extract rents that are generated by tax 
avoidance.” We use the setting of insider trading to examine whether this is an avenue through 
which managers extract rents associated with corporate tax avoidance activities.  
Consistent with Desai and Dharmapala (2009) and Blaylock (2016), we define rent 
extraction broadly as managerial opportunism. We focus on informed insider trading as a channel 
for managerial opportunism because when managers use non-public information to trade in their 
company shares, they personally benefit from these trades and directly reduce shareholders’ 
returns (e.g., Fried 2014). Such transfers of wealth from shareholders to managers can provide 
evidence of the agency problem associated with tax aggressiveness. Supporting the use of 
informed insider trading as a proxy for managerial opportunism in our setting, prior studies have 
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shown that insider trading is associated with various other types of managerial and firm 
misconduct, such as earnings management, restatements, SEC enforcement actions, shareholder 
litigation, options backdating and excess executive compensation (Ali and Hirshleifer 2015).1 
Given our stated objective, we develop a testable hypothesis on the association between 
tax aggressiveness and the profitability of insider trading. Tax aggressiveness can increase 
organization complexity and financial reporting opacity as managers intentionally obfuscate 
financial reporting and disclosure to avoid detection by tax authorities (e.g., Desai 2004; Desai and 
Dharmapala 2006). The result of the increased complexity and opacity can consequently hinder 
monitoring by shareholders and exacerbate agency problems between managers and shareholders; 
managers thus have greater opportunities for self-dealing under the guise of tax avoidance.2 To the 
extent that tax aggressiveness is motivated by managerial opportunism and self-serving objectives, 
we expect insiders to exploit the corporate opacity arising from tax aggressive activities to profit 
from trading in company shares. This line of reasoning suggests that the profitability of insider 
trading should increase with a firm’s tax aggressiveness.  
Following prior studies (e.g., Huddart and Ke 2007; Skaife et al. 2013), we define the 
profitability of insider trading as the profits earned after purchasing company shares and the losses 
avoided from selling company shares. If managers trade on their material, non-public information, 
the average insider trading profitability will be profitable. We utilize three measures of tax 
aggressiveness that are based on a firm’s cash effective tax rate, book-tax differences, and tax 
shelter prediction scores (Wilson 2009). To more effectively capture tax aggressiveness, we use 
                                                          
1 From a broader perspective, insider trading can reduce the willingness of outside investors to participate in equity 
ownership, undermines public confidence in the stock markets, and increases the firm’s cost of equity capital (e.g., 
Ausubel 1990; Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002). Insider trading is also socially undesirable based on the argument that 
it is unfair for insiders to trade on their private information with those that do not have access to such information. 
2 Examples of how managers can act opportunistically under the guise of tax planning include: 1) shifting income and 
cash to related parties in the pretext of lowering taxable income; and 2) overstating earnings and thus enabling 
managers to earn additional bonuses or conceal poor performance in the pretext of lowering effective tax rates. 
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indicator variables that equal one if the book-tax differences and tax shelter prediction score (cash 
effective tax rate) are (is) in the top (bottom) quintile of the sample population and zero otherwise.  
Using a large sample of firms from fiscal years 1996–2014 and controlling for factors 
associated with insider trading, we find that insider trading purchase profits are significantly higher 
in more tax aggressive firms. The economic magnitude expressed in dollars is also relatively 
significant – an increase of $74,245 to $80,185 in insider purchase profitability for an average firm 
in our sample based on our different measures of tax aggressiveness. We obtain qualitatively 
similar results when we include firm fixed effects to control for time-invariant firm characteristics. 
This result is consistent with insiders opportunistically exploiting the information advantage 
arising from tax aggressive activities to profitably purchase their company shares. In contrast, we 
do not find that insider trading sales profits are significantly higher in more tax aggressive firms 
than in other firms.  
Next, we examine whether the association between tax aggressiveness and insider trading 
profitability is weaker for firms that exert more effective monitoring over insiders than for firms 
with less effective monitoring. In addition, we examine whether a more opaque information 
environment enhances the ability of insiders to take advantage of the opacity associated with tax 
aggressiveness (that is, tax related opacity) to benefit from insider trading. We proxy for the 
effectiveness of monitoring using institutional ownership and proxy for the opacity of the firm’s 
information environment using a comprehensive opacity index developed by Anderson et al. 
(2009). Consistent with our expectations, we find that the positive association between tax 
aggressiveness and the profitability of insider purchases is attenuated for firms with higher 
institutional ownership and is accentuated for firms with a more opaque information environment. 
One possible explanation for why insiders of tax aggressive firms do not profit from sales 
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transactions is that insiders sell for reasons other than private information, such as diversification 
or portfolio rebalancing and liquidity needs (Ofek and Yermack 2000). To further examine 
whether insiders of tax aggressive firms are able to trade more profitably from their sales 
transactions, following Ravina and Sapienza (2010), we explore a setting where insider sales 
transactions are more likely to be information driven. Kim et al. (2011) find that the probability of 
stock price crashes increases with tax avoidance, a finding that they interpret as consistent with 
the opacity surrounding tax avoidance facilitating the accumulation and concealment of bad news; 
when the accumulated bad news is subsequently released simultaneously, the stock price crashes. 
Hence, we investigate whether tax aggressiveness is associated with greater insider trading 
intensity in the period prior to stock price crashes. Consistent with our expectations, we find that 
tax aggressiveness is significantly associated with greater insider sales volume in the fiscal year 
prior to the crash. 3  This result provides evidence that insiders of tax aggressive firms trade 
opportunistically to avoid losses prior to stock price crashes. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Interpretation No. 48 (“FIN 48”), which is 
effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2006, requires public firms to disclose their 
assessment of the amount of tax reserves recognized in financial statements in relation to those tax 
positions with an uncertain outcome and those that might not be sustainable upon audit. As a result 
of this mandatory disclosure, we expect the increased transparency of tax positions to reduce 
insiders’ information advantage and hence their ability to profit from insider trading. In a final 
                                                          
3 Descriptively, in terms of economic magnitude, the incremental losses avoided by insiders of tax aggressive firms 
from selling shares in the fiscal year prior to the stock price crash is estimated to be between $80,486 and $125,637 
as compared to other firms. These numbers are estimated by multiplying the incremental dollar value of shares sold 
for a tax aggressive firm (between $381,994 and $596,283) by the average abnormal returns during the week of the 
stock price crash (-21.07%). A more conservative estimate of the incremental losses avoided is estimated to be between 
$51,531 and $80,439 based on the average annual abnormal returns during the year of the stock price crash (-13.49%).  
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analysis, we find that the positive association between tax aggressiveness and insider trading 
profitability diminishes after the introduction of FIN 48, consistent with our expectations. 
Our study adds to the growing literature (e.g., Armstrong et al. 2015; Blaylock 2016; 
Seidman and Stomberg 2017) that empirically examines Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) theory 
that decisions on tax aggressiveness and managerial rent extraction are interdependent. 
Specifically, we provide empirical evidence regarding whether managers do, in fact, benefit from 
tax aggressiveness (Armstrong et al. 2015), and we report that one mechanism by which they do 
so is via insider trading. Our finding – that significant insider trading profits via insider purchases 
result from increasing (rather than decreasing) firm value – is not necessarily at odds with Desai 
and Dharmapala’s (2006) theory. Our finding suggests that while tax aggressive activities 
effectively transfer wealth from tax authorities to the firm, this wealth is not fully and fairly 
distributed to shareholders, particularly those who sold their shares to the managers: selling 
shareholders earn smaller returns from the increase in firm value than they would otherwise earn 
if managers did not make personal gains from opportunistic insider trades. Although the wealth 
transfer that is bornelost by the selling shareholders may be small relative to firm’s overall market 
value (less than one basis point of average market value), it is nonetheless material to the manager 
(i.e., about one to two percent of managers’ wealth estimates). Hence, we interpret this 
expropriation of wealth from selling shareholders to managers as an “indirect” form of rent 
extraction that reflects agency problems between managers and selling shareholders. 4  Our 
evidence of managerial opportunism associated with tax aggressiveness in the unique setting of 
insider trading is consistent with Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) theory of complementarities 
                                                          
4 Whether such agency costs engendered from tax aggressive activities are sufficiently large to lead to an overall 
reduction in firm value is beyond the scope of this study and has been directly or indirectly addressed by other studies, 
such as Desai and Dharmapala (2009) and Goh et al. (2016).    
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between tax aggressiveness and rent extraction and contributes to the ongoing debate on whether 
managers benefit from the opacity surrounding tax aggressive activities (e.g., Armstrong et al. 
2015). 
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the findings 
in the related literature and develop our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and our research 
methodology. We present and discuss the results in Section 4. Section 5 reports additional analyses 
and sensitivity tests, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
Corporate tax aggressiveness and insider trading  
 Tax avoidance is beneficial because it increases after-tax cash flows, which can be used to 
fund profitable investment opportunities, pay down debt, or distributed to shareholders. 
Notwithstanding the cash savings benefit of such activities, tax avoidance can be a potentially 
costly activity for shareholders. Aggressive tax planning requires the use of complex tax strategies 
such as employing transfer pricing, allocating debt for the purposes of earnings stripping, 
establishing offshore intellectual property havens, and consolidating business functions in low-tax 
jurisdictions. These tax planning arrangements can increase organizational complexity and 
financial opacity, making it more difficult for outsiders to understand the basis and sustainability 
of the firm’s earnings and cash flows (e.g., Bushman et al. 2004; Balakrishnan et al. 2016). 
Consistent with tax avoidance increasing organizational complexity and financial opacity, 
Balakrishnan et al. (2016) find that tax avoidance is associated with higher information 
uncertainty, higher information asymmetry, and lower earnings quality. Kim et al. (2011) find that 
tax aggressiveness is positively associated with a firm’s stock price crash risk, and Frank et al. 
(2009) find that aggressive tax reporting is associated with aggressive financial reporting.  
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Under the agency view of tax avoidance, the increased opacity from complex tax 
transactions afford opportunities for managerial self-dealing behavior (e.g., Desai 2004; Desai and 
Dharmapala 2006; Desai et al. 2007). These papers suggest that tax avoidance, especially in its 
aggressive form, can exacerbate and/or reflect agency problems between the firm and its 
shareholders.  
Although the agency view of tax avoidance is widely cited in the finance and accounting 
literature (Chen et al. 2010, Kim et al. 2011, Goh et al. 2013), empirical evidence on the managerial 
self-serving behavior associated with corporate tax aggressiveness is limited (Armstrong et al. 
2015). For instance, Blaylock (2016) seeks large sample evidence on whether tax avoidance is 
associated with economically significant managerial self-serving behavior. However, he is unable 
to find such evidence based on two proxies for managerial opportunism: low relative future firm 
performance and overinvestment. Blaylock (2016) concludes that researchers should exercise care 
when their predictions assume a relation between tax avoidance and managerial opportunism by 
carefully considering whether this agency theoretic assumption is appropriate and relevant for their 
sample firms. A recent study by Seidman and Stomberg (2017) also questions Desai and 
Dharmapala’s (2006) theory. In particular, they re-examine Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) 
empirical finding and find that it can be better explained by tax exhaustion rather than rent 
extraction. While the authors are cautious in concluding whether their findings disprove Desai and 
Dharmapala’s (2006) theory, they question whether the agency theoretic prediction between tax 
avoidance and rent extraction is empirically valid in large samples. 
Our study extends this literature that empirically examines Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) 
theory that tax aggressiveness can enable opportunistic managers to extract rents. Tax 
aggressiveness can increase organizational and transactional complexity and increase financial 
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reporting opacity as managers intentionally obfuscate financial reporting and disclosure to avoid 
detection by tax authorities (e.g., Desai 2004; Desai and Dharmapala 2006). The result of the 
increased complexity and opacity can consequently hinder monitoring by shareholders and 
exacerbate agency problems between managers and shareholders, offering managers greater 
opportunities for self-dealing under the guise of saving taxes. To the extent that tax aggressiveness 
is motivated by managerial opportunism to extract rents from shareholders, we expect rent-seeking 
insiders to exploit the corporate opacity arising from tax aggressive activities to profit from trading 
in company shares, as prior studies find that insider trading opportunities become more profitable 
as the degree of information asymmetry increases (Kyle 1985; Seyhun 1998; Aboody and Lev 
2000; Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Huddart and Ke 2007). Consequently, we expect insider trading 
profitability to increase with a firm’s tax aggressiveness. Our first hypothesis is as follows:  
 HYPOTHESIS 1. Ceteris paribus, firms’ tax aggressiveness is positively associated with 
the profitability of insider trading.  
Notwithstanding the above arguments, we may not observe tax aggressiveness to be 
associated with higher insider trading profitability, particularly for insider sales transactions. In 
particular, managers may not have incentives to sell company shares unless the concealment of the 
firm’s true performance becomes increasingly difficult and unless the stock price is about to crash 
(e.g., Kim et al. 2011). Moreover, prior literature suggests that insider sales transactions are 
generally less informative than insider purchase transactions because insiders sell for other 
reasons, such as diversification or portfolio rebalancing and liquidity needs (Ofek and Yermack 
2000).5 Furthermore, insider sales transactions can impose costs on managers. Johnson et al. 
                                                          
5 Lakonishok and Lee (2001, p. 98) aptly explain the informativeness of insider purchase and sales transactions as 
follows: “(t)here can be a variety of reasons for insiders to sell a stock, but the main reason to buy a stock has to be to 
make money.” 
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(2007) find a significantly greater association between litigation and abnormal insider selling after 
the adoption of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995, which presumably raised the 
barriers to frivolous lawsuits and in turn led plaintiffs to file lawsuits based on objective evidence 
such as abnormal insider sales. Therefore, whether insiders of tax aggressive firms earn abnormal 
profits from insider sales is ultimately an empirical question, and we examine whether tax 
aggressiveness is related to insider purchases and insider sales separately in our empirical analyses.  
Cross-sectional predictions 
Exploring the effect of effective monitoring 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) find that the effect of agency problems engendered by tax 
avoidance is more severe in firms with poor corporate governance and prior studies document that 
stronger governance is associated with greater firm transparency (e.g., Beyer et al. 2010). 
Therefore, while the opacity created from/by tax aggressiveness provides more opportunities for 
managers to engage in insider trading, stronger monitoring can reduce the information advantage 
of managers and hence the opportunities for profitable insider trading. In addition, we also 
acknowledge the possibility that stronger monitoring can limit opportunistic insider trading by 
influencing the firms to adopt insider trading restrictions (e.g., Jagolinzer et al. 2011; Dai et al. 
2016) consequently attenuating the relation between tax aggressiveness and insider trading 
profitability. Hence, our first cross-sectional hypothesis is as follows: 
HYPOTHESIS 2a. Ceteris paribus, the positive association between firms’ tax 
aggressiveness and the profitability of insider trading is weaker for firms that have more effective 
monitoring. 
Exploring the effect of overall firm opacity 
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 The ability of insiders to trade profitably stems from the information asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders (e.g., Aboody and Lev 2000; Frankel and Li 2004; Huddart and Ke 2007). 
While the opacity created from/by aggressive and complex tax transactions provides managers the 
opportunity to benefit from insider trades and reduce shareholders’ returns, this problem could be 
exacerbated if the firm’s overall information environment, independent of any tax-related opacity, 
is opaque. This exacerbation is because prior studies suggest that higher (lower) information 
quality enhances (hinders) investors’ ability to assess firms’ expected values and uncertainty of 
future cash flows (e.g., Lambert et al. 2007). Therefore, although tax aggressiveness increase 
organizational complexity and tax-related opacity, we expect that for firms with greater overall 
firm opacity, outside investors are even less able to assess the benefits and uncertainty behind tax 
planning activities, hence increasing the information advantage managers have over the outside 
investors and increasing the profitability of insider trading.  
Note that it is unlikely that the overall opacity of a firm’s information environment is driven 
solely from their complex tax transactions, and substantial variation can exist across firm’s 
information environment as a result of each firm’s voluntary and mandatory disclosures as well as 
disclosures by other information intermediaries such as financial analysts, industry experts and 
financial press (Healy and Palepu 2001). What we attempt to capture here is the opacity of the 
firm’s information environment that is independent from the opacity created from/by tax 
aggressiveness, and we examine how this opacity can moderate the relation between tax 
aggressiveness and insider trading profits. For brevity, we refer to this opacity as “overall firm 
opacity.” In Section 3, we detail how we measure overall firm opacity after isolating the opacity 
created from/by tax aggressiveness (i.e., tax opacity). Our second cross-sectional hypothesis is as 
follows: 
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HYPOTHESIS 2b. Ceteris paribus, the positive association between firms’ tax 
aggressiveness and the profitability of insider trading is stronger for firms with greater overall 
firm opacity. 
3. Research Design 
Measure of insider trading profitability 
 We focus on the insider trading transactions of officers and directors following prior insider 
trading literature (e.g., Ke et al. 2003; Piotroski and Roulstone 2005; Cheng and Lo 2006; Huddart 
et al. 2007). We then define insider trading profitability as the (unrealized) profits earned after 
purchases and losses avoided from sales (e.g., Huddart and Ke 2007; Skaife et al. 2013). The profit 
from insider trading over a particular time period is determined by (1) the stock returns after each 
transaction, (2) the dollar value of each transaction, and (3) the frequency of these transactions.   
To construct our measure, we first aggregate all trading transactions by insiders of the same 
firm on the same day and treat multiple transactions made on the same firm-day as a single 
transaction. We then compute the one-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (size adjusted) for the 
period beginning one day after the transaction date.6 The gain from purchases is then computed by 
multiplying the abnormal return by the dollar value traded. The gain from sales is computed 
analogously and then multiplied by negative one such that losses avoided on sales are interpreted 
the same as gains on purchases. Finally, we aggregate individual transactions at the firm-year level 
to obtain an aggregate profitability measure of all insider trades (sales or purchases) during the 
fiscal year: 
                                                          
6 Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 restricts insiders from engaging in short-term opportunistic 
trading by requiring insiders to pay back profits attributable to offsetting purchases and sales that occur within six 
months of each other. As a result, prior work generally finds that insiders trade profitably when trading profits are 
measured over periods of one-year (e.g. Lakonishok and Lee 2001) or even longer (e.g., Ke et al. 2003). Following 
Skaife et al. (2013), we measure insider trading profitability over a one-year period. Results are qualitatively similar 
when we examine three-month, six-month, nine-month or eighteen-month period returns. 
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𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 × 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴_𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝑀𝑀𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1  
where INS_PROFITit is either insider sales or purchase profitability (SALE_PROFIT and 
PURCH_PROFIT respectively), ABRETitj is equal to the one-year-ahead buy-and-hold abnormal 
return computed for the period starting one day after transaction date j, VALUE_TRADEDitj equals 
the total dollar value of shares either sold or purchased by all insiders on day j, n is the total number 
of firm-days with insider sales or purchase activity during firm-year it, and MVit-1 is the market 
value of equity at the end of fiscal year t-1.7 Following Skaife et al. (2013), we multiply the insider 
trading profitability measure by 100 to express this measure as a percentage of MVit-1. 
 Finally, as highlighted by Frankel and Li (2004), insiders are unlikely to trade on their 
private information if they expect the trade to be unprofitable, and hence, they would refrain from 
trading if they do not possess superior information. Therefore, we follow prior work (Huddart and 
Ke 2007; Skaife et al. 2013) and set INS_PROFIT equal to zero in firm-years with no reported 
insider trades in our sample. In additional robustness tests, we examine an alternative sample 
selection excluding firm-years with no reported insider trades (see Section 4). 
Measures of tax aggressiveness 
 Currently, the literature contains no consensus on a single measure that perfectly captures 
tax aggressiveness. Therefore, we utilize three measures that have been used in various settings in 
the literature (e.g., Kim et al. 2011; Rego and Wilson 2012). Because we are interested in tax 
planning activities that are considered aggressive, complex, and hence more likely to be associated 
with managerial opportunism, we focus on firms with tax avoidance measures in the top quintile 
of the sample population and classify these firms as tax aggressive. Our first measure is based on 
                                                          
7 Because the magnitude of insider trade is significantly associated with firm size, we follow Skaife et al. (2013) and 
scale our measure of insider trading profitability by the market value of equity to alleviate concerns that our results 
are driven by large firms in our sample. 
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a firm’s cash effective tax rate, which is an indicator that equals one if the firm’s one-year cash 
effective tax rate is in the bottom quintile of the sample population and zero otherwise (CETR). 
The cash effective tax rate is defined as cash taxes paid (TXPD) divided by pre-tax income (PI). 
Following Chen et al. (2010), we remove observations with negative pre-tax income and those 
observations with a cash effective tax rate below zero or above one.8 We use the cash effective tax 
rate because it reflects both permanent and temporary book-tax differences, it accounts for the 
income tax benefits of employee stock options, and it is unaffected by adjustments in accounting 
estimates such as valuation allowance and tax reserves.   
Our second measure, BTDFACTOR, is an indicator that equals one if the first principal 
component of the following three book-tax difference-based measures is in the top quintile of the 
sample population – (1) total book-tax difference (TBTD), (2) Frank et al. (2009) discretionary 
permanent book-tax difference (DTAX), and (3) Desai and Dharmapala (2006) residual book-tax 
difference (DDBTD) – and zero otherwise.9 TBTD includes both temporary and permanent book-
tax differences, and we utilize this measure as an overall measure of the firm’s tax avoidance 
activities. We employ DTAX as a measure of tax aggressiveness because it captures permanent 
differences that are unrelated to items that are not considered aggressive tax reporting, such as 
state income taxes and tax credits. Finally, as highlighted by Desai and Dharmapala (2006), book-
tax differences could be influenced by both tax planning activities and accrual-based earnings 
management. Because DDBTD is estimated from a firm fixed-effect regression after controlling 
                                                          
8 We recognize that our measure of CETR requires pre-tax income to be positive and hence requires our sample firms 
for empirical tests using this measure to be profitable leading to possible data truncation bias. However, our other 
measures of tax avoidance do not require firms to be profitable in order to be included in our sample. This is evidenced 
by the larger sample size for these other measures. 
9 We choose to combine all three book-tax difference measures into one factor because these three book-tax difference 
measures are highly correlated with one another (Pearson correlation between 0.27 to 0.69), and a factor analysis of 
these three measures produces only a single factor that exhibits an Eigenvalue greater than one (Eigenvalue = 2.00), 
which suggests significant commonality among these three factors. 
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for total accruals, this measure attempts to isolate the component of book-tax differences and, 
hence, the tax aggressive activity that is unexplained by earnings management.  
 Finally, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) consider a tax shelter to be the most aggressive form 
of tax avoidance along the continuum of tax planning strategies. Hence, our last measure of tax 
aggressiveness is based on the tax shelter prediction score that was developed by Wilson (2009) 
and used in prior literature (e.g., Kim et al. 2011; Rego and Wilson 2012). SHELTER is an indicator 
that equals one if the firm’s tax shelter prediction score is in the top quintile of the sample 
population and zero otherwise. The detailed measurement of these measures of tax aggressiveness 
is explained in the Appendix.    
Empirical models 
To test Hypothesis 1, we estimate the following pooled cross-sectional regression: 
INS_PROFITit = α + βTAXit + ψFIRM_CONTROLSit + IND_FE + εit                               (1), 
where INS_PROFIT refers to either insider sales or purchase profitability (SALE_PROFIT or 
PURCH_PROFIT, respectively), TAX refers to the measure of tax aggressiveness (CETR, 
BTDFACTOR or SHELTER), FIRM_CONTROLS refers to a vector of firm-level controls, and 
IND_FE refers to industry fixed effects, which we include to account for unobserved heterogeneity 
across industries. Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive coefficient on TAX. Because we conduct our 
hypothesis testing on a pooled panel data set, we use firm and year clustered standard errors to 
control for time series and cross-sectional dependence in the data (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). 
The Appendix includes detailed definitions for all variables. 
 We select an extensive set of FIRM_CONTROLS that are associated with insider trading 
based on prior literature. We control for firm size (LNMV) because Seyhun (1986) and Lakonishok 
and Lee (2001) find that insiders respectively trade more and trade more profitably in small firms. 
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We control for the book-to-market ratio (BTM), prior stock returns (PRIOR_RET), the earnings-
to-price ratio (EP) and past sales growth (AVG_GROWTH) because prior studies suggest that 
insiders trade as contrarians (Rozeff and Zaman 1998; Piotroski and Roulstone 2005; Huddart et 
al. 2007). Following the findings of prior studies (Aboody and Lev 2000; Frankel and Li 2004; 
Huddart and Ke 2007), we include various proxies for information asymmetry and the 
characteristics of the firm’s information environment that are known to be associated with insider 
trading, such as firm age (AGE), prior year loss (LOSS), R&D expenditure (RND), the median 
absolute abnormal return over past earnings announcements (MAG_AR), number of analysts 
following (ANALYST), institutional ownership (IOHOLD), financial statement informativeness 
(FS_INFORM), and return volatility (RET_VOL).  
We also control for the opacity of the firm’s information environment using a 
comprehensive opacity index (OPACITY) based on Anderson et al. (2009).10 By including these 
various controls for information asymmetry and the characteristics of the firm’s information 
environment, we ensure that the coefficient on TAX, β, captures the incremental effect of tax 
aggressiveness on insider trading profitability over and above these previously documented 
associations between information asymmetry/environment and insider trading. Following Gao et 
al. (2014), we include share turnover (TURNOVER) to control for investor interest and the market 
visibility of the firm’s stock. We additionally control for insider trading restrictions (RESTRICT) 
because Roulstone (2003) finds that insider trades are less profitable when trading restrictions are 
in place. Prior work suggests that insiders may manipulate their earnings prior to opportunistic 
insider trading (e.g., Beneish and Vargus 2002; Bartov and Mohanram 2004) and that tax 
aggressiveness is associated with aggressive financial reporting (e.g., Frank et al. 2009). Hence, 
                                                          
10 The detailed description of this measure is explained in the later part of Section 3 and in the Appendix. 
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we control for accruals management (ACCEM) to mitigate concerns that our measure of tax 
aggressiveness merely captures the effect of the prior documented association between accrual 
management and insider trading. 
 Finally, we include a set of control variables that prior literature (e.g., Chen et al. 2010) 
documented to be associated with tax planning, such as accounting performance (ROA), leverage 
(LEVERAGE), tax loss carryforwards (NOL), foreign income (FI), property, plant and equipment 
(PPE), intangibles (INTANG) and equity income in earnings (EQINC). By including this set of 
tax-related control variables that are more associated with benign tax planning, we intend to 
capture the incremental effect of aggressive and complex tax planning on insider trading 
profitability, which is more relevant to our research question. 
To test Hypothesis 2, we modify equation (1) to include the conditioning variable 
(Conditioning_VAR) and the interaction between TAX and Conditioning_VAR. Additionally, we 
include the interaction between firm-level controls and the conditioning variable to allow the effect 
of the conditioning variable to vary across all other firm attributes:11 
INS_PROFITit = α + βTAXit + ψFIRM_CONTROLSit +γConditioning_VARit  
+ ηTAXit × Conditioning_VARit + ∑φFIRM_CONTROLSit × Conditioning_VARit  
+ IND_FE + εit                                     (2) 
While a proxy for monitoring, IOHOLD, is included as a control variable in the main 
model, in Hypothesis 2a, we examine the moderating effect of monitoring on the relation between 
tax aggressiveness and insider trading profitability. We use the percentage of shares held by 
institutional investors (IOHOLD) as a proxy for effective monitoring because prior studies suggest 
                                                          
11  The inclusion of the interaction between firm-level controls and the conditioning variable may result in 
multicollinearity among the regressors. To alleviate this issue, we mean-center the conditioning variable (IOHOLD 
and OPACITY) in our regression analyses. 
17 
 
that institutional shareholders with significant ownership stakes have the incentives and resources 
to undertake costly monitoring activities and thus play an important role in firm governance (e.g., 
Grossman and Hart 1980; Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Huddart 1993; Chung et al. 2002; Parrino et 
al. 2003).12 Therefore, we expect firms with higher institutional ownership (IOHOLD) to have 
more effective monitoring over opportunistic insider trading in tax aggressive firms, hence 
weakening the positive association between tax aggressiveness and insider trading profitability.13   
While a proxy for overall firm opacity, OPACITY, is included as a control variable in the 
main model, in Hypothesis 2b, we examine the moderating effect of an opaque information 
environment on the relation between tax aggressiveness and insider trading profitability. 
Following Anderson et al. (2009), we measure the opacity of the firm’s information environment 
using a comprehensive opacity index (OPACITY) that comprises four individual proxies for 
opacity commonly used in prior literature: (1) trading volume, (2) bid-ask spread, (3) analyst 
following, and (4) analyst forecast errors. The opacity of a firm’s information environment is 
presumed to be increasing in its bid-ask spread and analyst forecast errors and decreasing in its 
trading volume and analyst following. This index is derived by ranking each of these proxies into 
deciles of opacity and allocating scores from one (least opaque) to ten (most opaque). The opacity 
index for each firm is then obtained by summing the scores across these four proxies and then 
dividing by the maximum possible score of forty, such that the opacity index ranges from 0.1 to 
1.0. We expect insiders of tax aggressive firms in more opaque information environments to earn 
                                                          
12 Chen et al. (2007) find that independent and long-term institutional investors (ILTI) exert more effective monitoring 
relative to other institutional investors. In untabulated analysis, we utilize their measure of ILTI as an alternative proxy 
for monitoring by institutional investors. The results are quantitatively similar using this alternative proxy. 
13 We select institutional ownership out of many other measures of corporate governance because this measure is 
widely used in the extant literature (e.g., Chen et al. 2010), and this measure results in the least sample restriction. 
That being said, we explore alternative governance proxies such as 1) E-Index; 2) G-Index; 3) Board independence; 
4) Board size; 5) CEO-chair duality. In terms of the sign of the interaction variable between these governance proxies 
and TAX, we find somewhat consistent signs of the coefficients but they are statistically insignificant, possibly due to 
lower statistical power based on a much smaller sample (untabulated).   
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higher profits from insider trading.   
As we explained earlier in the hypothesis development, we attempt to capture the opacity 
of the firm’s information environment that is independent from the opacity created from/by tax 
aggressiveness. Empirically, because we control for overall firm opacity (OPACITY) in our 
regression examining the relation between tax aggressiveness (TAX) and insider trading profits, 
TAX should capture the incremental effect of the opacity created from/by tax aggressiveness (“tax 
opacity”) and OPACITY should pick up the incremental effect of the overall firm opacity that is 
independent from tax opacity.  In an additional robustness test to further isolate firm opacity from 
tax opacity, we regress OPACITY on our measure of tax aggressiveness (TAX) and then use the 
residuals from this regression as a proxy for firm opacity that is orthogonal to the opacity 
engendered by tax planning. We discuss the results for the main analysis and this additional 
robustness test in Section 4. 
4. Sample and Results 
Sample 
 Our sample period spans the period from 1996 to 2014 because the coverage of insider 
trading transactions by Thomson Reuter is minimal before 1996. We collect our financial and stock 
performance data primarily from I/B/E/S, Compustat, and CRSP in computing tax aggressiveness, 
the hypothesized conditioning variables, and the control variables used in the regression analysis. 
Following prior insider trading studies (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Frankel and Li 2004), to 
avoid unnecessary noise in estimating returns, we exclude firms whose stock prices are less than 
$2 at the beginning of each year. We collect insider trading transaction data from Thomson 
Reuters, which gathers data from Form 4 filings with the SEC.14 Following prior literature (e.g., 
                                                          
14 In the Form 4 filings, insiders include officers, directors and large shareholders of more than 10% of any equity 
class of securities of an issuing company. We exclude the transactions of “large shareholders” from insiders. 
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Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Frankel and Li 2004), we examine only open market and private trading 
transactions and exclude grant and award transactions. In addition, we require firms to report at 
least three insider purchase and three insider sales transactions over the entire sample period to be 
included in our sample. In this way, we ensure that the insiders in our sample are active traders 
with the ability and opportunity to trade based on private information.15 The sample size varies for 
each test because of the specific tax measure used in the test. We also winsorize each continuous 
variable except the insider trading profitability measure at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the 
effect of outliers. We do not winsorize the profitability measure for several reasons. First, prior 
literature documents that the distribution of stock returns are right-skewed and some studies have 
cautioned against trimming/winsorizing stock returns (e.g., Kothari et al. 2005; Core 2006; Teoh 
and Zhang 2011). Because the insider trading profitability measure is calculated based on stock 
returns, we do not winsorize this measure. Second, by winsorizing the extreme profitability 
observations where insiders have the greatest information advantage, we are throwing away the 
best setting to test our hypothesis.16 The final sample size used in the regression analyses ranges 
from 20,444 to 28,067 firm-year observations for the 19-year sample period. 
Descriptive statistics 
 Table 1, panel A reports descriptive statistics for the regression variables. The mean dollar 
amount of insider sales profitability (SALES_PROFIT$) is -$250,459, which is consistent with the 
prior finding that insiders do not generally profit from sales transactions (e.g., Aboody and Lev 
                                                          
15 With this sample restriction, we drop 25.9% of our initial sample of firms, resulting in a final sample of 28,067 
firm-year observations. We use three insider sales and purchases as a cut-off point because requiring this condition 
reduces the proportion of both zero purchase and sales firm-years in the sample to below 50%. However, our 
inferences do not change even if we require the sample firms to have at least two or four purchases and sales over the 
sample period.   
16 That being said, we check the robustness of our results to winsorizing the insider trading profitability measure. We 
find that the coefficients on the variables of interest are smaller in magnitude (results untabulated) based on the 
winsorized profitability but our inferences are qualitatively similar to the results using unwinsorized profitability 
measure. 
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2000; Huddart and Ke 2007; Jagolinzer et al. 2011; Gao et al. 2014). The mean dollar amount of 
insider purchase profitability (PURCHASE_PROFIT$) is $47,517, which is consistent with the 
results obtained by Lakonishok and Lee (2001), who find that insiders profit from purchase 
transactions on average and do not buy if they do not possess superior information (Frankel and 
Li 2004; Ravina and Sapienza 2010). 17  Insider sales profitability and transaction value are 
significantly larger in magnitude than insider purchase profitability and transaction value, and the 
average annual frequency of insider sales (36.2 transactions) is also greater than the average annual 
frequency of insider purchases (4.1 transactions). This finding reflects the greater propensity for 
insiders to sell their shares and sell them in larger amounts in order to diversify the large proportion 
of their wealth held in company stocks received from compensation plans (Ofek and Yermack 
2000).   
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 1, panel B provides descriptive statistics partitioned by tax aggressiveness. As observed 
from this table, the mean insider purchase profitability are generally significantly higher for tax 
aggressive firms (TAX = 1), whereas the mean insider sale profitability are generally significantly 
lower for tax aggressive firms. Tax aggressive firms are also significantly different from non-tax 
aggressive firms on many firm characteristics, suggesting it is important to control for these firm 
characteristics in our empirical specification to avoid spurious findings. 
Table 2 reports the Pearson and Spearman correlation table of the variables in our paper. 
Both the Pearson and Spearman correlations between these three measures of tax aggressiveness 
(CETR, BTDFACTOR and SHELTER) are positive, suggesting that all three measures capture 
                                                          
17 Recall that our measure of insider trading profitability includes firm-year observations for which there are no 
reported insider trades (e.g., Huddart and Ke 2007; Skaife et al. 2013). If we eliminate firm-years with zero sales 
(purchase) transactions, the mean unscaled insider sales (purchase) profitability is -$310,099 ($91,435), and the 
average annual frequency of insider sales (purchase) is 44.9 (7.8) transactions.   
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aggressive tax planning activities in general. However, the correlations among the three measures 
range from 0.04 to 0.32, suggesting that each measure likely captures different dimensions of tax 
aggressiveness and hence support our choice of using three measures in our analyses to triangulate 
our results and increase the robustness of our findings. The correlations between SALE_PROFIT 
and all three measures of tax aggressiveness are either not significant (Pearson correlation) or 
negative and significant (Spearman correlation). However, the correlations between 
PURCH_PROFIT and tax aggressiveness measures are generally positive and significant, which 
is consistent with our prediction in Hypothesis 1. Because these are pairwise univariate 
correlations, we defer the main analyses and our inferences to our multivariate tests in the later 
section.18  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Main analysis – test of Hypothesis 1 
In this section, we report our results for the test of Hypothesis 1, which predicts a positive 
association between tax aggressiveness and insider trading profitability. As shown in Table 3, all 
three measures of tax aggressiveness are positively and significantly associated with insider 
purchase profitability (t-statistics all greater than 2.10). The effect of tax aggressiveness on insider 
purchase profitability is also economically significant in percentage terms. Specifically, being 
classified as tax aggressive based on the cash effective tax rate (CETR), book-tax difference factor 
(BTDFACTOR) and tax shelter prediction score (SHELTER) is associated with 156%, 169% and 
                                                          
18 As observed from Table 2, some of the correlations are quite high. The Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for the 
analyses without interaction variables (Tables 3 and 6) are less than 10, but the VIF for the analyses with the interaction 
variables ranges from 10.09 to 21.08, suggesting a multicollinearity problem. To alleviate any multicollinearity 
problem, we mean-center the conditioning variables in Table 4 (see Footnote 11), and the VIF declines to between 
5.92 and 8.96, which suggests that mean-centering significantly mitigates the multicollinearity problem.  
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156% increases in insider purchase profitability, respectively.19 Expressed in dollar terms, being 
classified as tax aggressive translates to an increase of $74,245 to $80,185 in insider purchase 
profitability for an average firm in our sample with insider purchase profitability of $47,517; this 
result suggests economically significant rent extraction by insiders of tax aggressive firms.20,21 
The results for insider purchase profitability are thus consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
[Insert Table 3 here]  
However, we find that none of the tax measures is significantly associated with insider 
sales profitability (t-statistics all below 1.40). The nonsignificant results for insider sales 
profitability are consistent with prior research that insider purchase transactions are generally more 
likely to be information driven (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Ravina and Sapienza 2010; 
Jagolinzer et al. 2011) and that insider sales transactions are generally less informative because 
insiders sell for other reasons, such as diversification or portfolio rebalancing and liquidity needs 
(Ofek and Yermack 2000). In a later analysis (section 5), we explore a setting (i.e., the period prior 
to stock price crashes) where insider sales transactions are more likely to be information driven. 
                                                          
19 The impact of being classified as tax aggressive based on cash effective tax rate (CETR) on the insider purchase 
profitability (PURCH_PROFIT) is computed as 0.025 (coefficient on CETR) ÷ 0.016 (the sample mean of 
PURCH_PROFIT) = 156.25%. The comparative statics for BTDFACTOR and SHELTER are computed analogously.  
20 The economic significance in dollar terms of being classified as tax aggressive based on cash effective tax rate 
(CETR) on the insider purchase profitability is computed as 156.25% (the economic significance in percentage terms) 
× $47,517 (the mean insider purchase profitability) = $74,245. The comparative statics for BTDFACTOR and 
SHELTER are computed analogously. As an alternative computation of economic significance in dollar terms, we use 
the unscaled insider purchase profitability (PURCHASE_PROFIT$) as the dependent variable in our empirical model. 
Based on this specification, being classified as tax aggressive translates to an increase of $57,032 to $102,592 in 
insider purchase profitability, which is similar in magnitude as those reported above. 
21 The value of the insider trade gain to the manager scaled by the total market value of equity of the firm is relatively 
small. For an average firm in our sample with a market value of equity of $890m, the wealth transfer is only at most 
0.0090% of the market value, which is relatively immaterial to the firm. Hence, we explore whether this wealth transfer 
is significant or material to the manager. First, we obtain the dollar value of insider holdings prior to the inside trade 
from Form 4 filings with the SEC. The wealth transfer relative to the managers’ insider holdings is about 1.30%. 
Second, we obtain the dollar amount of salary and bonus of the top five executives from ExecuComp. The wealth 
transfer relative to the managers’ salary and bonus is about 2.24%. Third, we quantify the amount of wealth transfer 
in percentage terms by dividing the dollar value of the trading profit by the mean purchase value of the inside trades. 
The one-year insider trading returns computed this way is about 13.54%. Taken together, these statistics suggest that 
the amount of wealth transfer may not be trivial to the manager.  
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 The coefficients on the other control variables are generally consistent with those in the 
literature. In particular, we find that insiders purchase less profitably in larger firms (LNMV), but 
they also sell more profitably in larger firms. We also find that insiders trade as contrarians and 
earn more profits from purchases when book-to-market (BTM) is high and prior returns 
(PRIOR_RET) are low. To the extent that sales growth (AVG_GROWTH) is associated with future 
earnings realization, we find that insider sales are less profitable when past sales growth is high. 
We also find that insiders earn more profits when information asymmetry is high, as proxied by 
research and development expenditure (RND) and return volatility (RET_VOL), and they earn 
lower profits when there is a greater analyst following (ANALYST) and institutional ownership 
(IOHOLD). We do not find that insiders earn significantly more profits when overall firm opacity 
is high (OPACITY). Contrary to our expectations, we find that insiders also earn more profit when 
financial statement informativeness is high (FSINFORM). Additionally, we find mixed evidence 
when we use prior year loss (LOSS) as a proxy for information asymmetry in that we find insiders 
purchase more profitably but also sell less profitably when the firm reports a loss in the prior fiscal 
year. We also find some evidence that higher accruals management is associated with higher 
insider sales profitability, which is consistent with the prior finding that insiders manipulate 
earnings prior to insider trading (e.g., Beneish and Vargus 2002; Bartov and Mohanram 2004). 
With regard to the tax-related control variables, we find some evidence that insiders purchase more 
profitably when accounting performance (ROA) and leverage (LEVERAGE) is high, and when 
there is no tax loss carryforward (NOL) and property, plant and equipment (PPE) is low. Finally, 
the adjusted R2 from each model is comparable to that reported in prior studies (e.g., Huddart and 
Ke 2007; Skaife et al. 2013). 
  In additional robustness tests, we examine the following alternative samples: 1) excluding 
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firm-year observations with no insider trades; 2) excluding firm-year observations with no insider 
purchases, which comprises the majority of firm-year observations with no insider trades. Our 
main inferences remain unchanged, and are even stronger based on these alternative samples. We 
also consider using an alternative measure of tax aggressiveness based on the bottom quintile of 
three-year or five-year cash effective tax rates. Results are weaker but qualitatively similar based 
on these alternative measures. 
Cross-sectional analyses – Test of Hypothesis 2 
 In this section, we explore cross-sectional variation in the relation between tax 
aggressiveness and insider trading profitability. In Hypothesis 2a we argue that more effective 
monitoring can reduce the extent of opportunistic insider trading of tax aggressive firms, and 
hence, the positive association between tax aggressiveness and insider trading profitability should 
be weaker for firms with more effective monitoring. Panel A of Table 4 presents the results of this 
analysis using the percentage of institutional ownership (IOHOLD) as a proxy for the strength of 
monitoring. 22  We find that the positive association between tax aggressiveness and insider 
purchase profitability is significantly weaker for firms with higher institutional ownership. This 
result is consistent with our prediction in Hypothesis 2a that more effective monitoring mitigates 
opportunistic trading by insiders of tax aggressive firms and hence limits their ability to trade 
profitably from insider purchases.23 Given that we do not find a significant association between 
tax aggressiveness and insider sales profitability, we do not test the moderating effect of 
monitoring on this association. 
                                                          
22 To conserve space, in subsequent tables we do not tabulate the estimated coefficients on the control variables and 
the control variables interacted with the moderating variable. 
23 Blaylock (2016) fails to find a difference in the relation between tax avoidance and rent extraction for well versus 
poorly governed firms. We believe that the main difference in our finding is that Blaylock (2016) focuses on the level 
of managerial entrenchment (proxied using E-index, G-index and a dual class share structure) as the most relevant 
aspect of corporate governance in his setting, while our study focuses on institutional ownership as the main proxy 
for monitoring strength.  
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[Insert Table 4 here] 
In Hypothesis 2b we argue that greater overall firm opacity enhances the private information 
advantage of insiders of tax aggressive firms. In panel B of Table 4, we present the results using 
the opacity index (OPACITY) to proxy for overall firm opacity. We find that the positive 
association between tax aggressiveness and insider purchase profitability is significantly stronger 
for firms with a higher opacity index, although the interaction coefficient is positive but not 
significant when we examine SHELTER. Next, when we replace OPACITY with the residual from 
regressing OPACITY on TAX, we find that the results (untabulated) are qualitatively similar to 
those in panel B of Table 4. Given that we do not find a significant association between tax 
aggressiveness and insider sales profitability in Table 3, we do not test the moderating effect of 
overall firm opacity on this association. Overall, our results suggest that greater overall firm 
opacity increases the ability of insiders of tax aggressive firms to earn more profits from insider 
purchases, consistent with our prediction in Hypothesis 2b. 
5. Additional Analyses and Sensitivity Checks 
Firm fixed effects specification and controlling for alternative explanations 
 In our main analyses, we include an extensive set of control variables that have been 
documented in prior literature to be correlated with insider trading profitability as well as our 
measures of tax aggressiveness. To further mitigate concerns that omitted variables could be 
driving our results, we include firm fixed effects, as opposed to industry fixed effects in our earlier 
specifications, to control for time-invariant firm characteristics, and we assume that any potential 
omitted variables are stable and constant over time. In untabulated analyses, we continue to find 
that all three measures of tax aggressiveness are positively and significantly associated with insider 
purchase profitability. Consistent with our earlier results, we do not find that tax aggressiveness is 
26 
 
associated with insider sales profitability. These results suggest that our earlier findings are robust 
to potential omitted variables that are stationary over time. 
Another alternative explanation for our finding that insider purchase profitability is 
significantly higher for tax aggressive firms is that tax aggressiveness is simply a proxy for future 
profitability. To mitigate this alternative explanation, we check the robustness of our results by 
including the one-year-ahead change in ROA (defined as the change in income before 
extraordinary items scaled by average total assets) as an additional control variable in our main 
analyses. Our inferences are unchanged (results untabulated). We also use alternative proxies for 
future profitability, such as (1) the level of ROA, (2) the change in operating income before 
depreciation, (3) the change in net income, and (4) analysts’ long-term growth forecasts. Our 
results are robust to these alternative specifications (results untabulated). 
Insider trading intensity prior to firm-specific stock price crashes 
In our earlier analyses, we generally find that insiders of tax aggressive firms are able to 
trade more profitably in purchases but not in sales, possibly because insiders generally sell for 
other non-information driven reasons. In this section, we follow Ravina and Sapienza (2010) and 
explore a setting where insider sales transactions are more likely to be information driven. 
As mentioned earlier, Kim et al. (2011) find that stock price crash risk increases with tax 
avoidance, consistent with the opacity surrounding tax avoidance activities facilitating the 
accumulation and concealment of bad news, which results in stock price crashes when the 
accumulated bad news is eventually released simultaneously. If tax avoidance activities are 
opportunistic, managers are likely to be aware of any “bad news” hidden within the tax avoidance 
framework and to dispose of their shares before future stock price crashes. Hence, we investigate 
whether tax aggressiveness is associated with insider trading intensity (lower purchase volume and 
27 
 
higher sale volume) in the period prior to stock price crashes.24  
Following prior work (Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011), we define a crash in a specific 
year for a particular firm as a week during which the firm experiences firm-specific weekly returns 
3.09 standard deviations below the mean firm-specific weekly returns over the entire fiscal year 
(3.09 standard deviations is chosen so as to generate a frequency of 0.1% in the normal 
distribution). The firm-specific weekly returns are estimated based on the residual return from the 
expanded market model.25 For firms that experience crashes in a particular fiscal year, we examine 
whether tax aggressiveness is associated with insider trading intensity in the prior fiscal year before 
the crash year. In particular, we estimate the following pooled cross-sectional regression for firm-
year observations that experience crashes during the fiscal year t+1: 
INS_VOLit = α + βTAXit + ψFIRM_CONTROLSit + IND_FE + εit                               (3), 
where INS_VOL refers to either insider sales volume or purchase volume (SALE_VOL or 
PURCH_VOL, respectively), TAX, FIRM_CONTROLS, and IND_FE are similarly defined as 
before in (1). If insiders of tax aggressive firms are opportunistic and dispose of their shares (or 
refrain from purchasing shares) before future stock price crashes, we expect a positive (negative) 
coefficient on TAX when SALE_VOL (PURCH_VOL) is the dependent variable. 
The results are presented in Table 5. We find that tax aggressiveness is significantly 
associated with greater insider sales volume in the fiscal year prior to the crash (with the exception 
of CETR). We do not find that tax aggressiveness is significantly associated with lower insider 
                                                          
24  We examine insider trading volume instead of trading profit in this set of analysis because of the potential 
mechanical relationship between future stock price crashes and lower insider trading profitability - recall that our 
measure of insider trading profitability is the summation of one-year ahead individual trades, which overlaps with the 
period where the stock price crash occurs. 
25 In particular, the firm-specific weekly return, denoted by W, is defined as the natural log of one plus the residual 
return from the expanded market model regression, following Kim et al. (2011): 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖−2 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖+1 + 𝛽𝛽5𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚,𝑖𝑖+2 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 
where rj,t is the return on stock j in week t and rm,t is the return on the CRSP value-weighted market index in week t. 
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purchase volume in the fiscal year prior to the crash. This result based on the crash sample stands 
in contrast with the results in the main analyses where we find that tax aggressiveness is associated 
with higher insider purchase profitability. The overall results suggest that insiders of tax aggressive 
firms dispose of their shares opportunistically to avoid losses and refrain from purchasing shares 
prior to stock price crashes.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Post-FIN 48 period 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Interpretation No. 48 (“FIN 48”), which is 
effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2006, requires public firms to disclose their 
assessment of the amount of tax reserves recognized in financial statements in relation to those tax 
positions with an uncertain outcome and those that might not be sustainable upon audit 
(“unrecognized tax benefits”). According to the FASB, the purpose of this interpretation is to 
increase relevance and comparability in the financial reporting of income taxes and to provide 
more information about the extent of uncertain tax positions that firms undertake. As a result of 
this mandatory disclosure of uncertain tax positions under FIN 48, we expect an increase in 
transparency surrounding these tax positions. Therefore, we expect insiders’ information 
advantage to decrease and hence the positive association between tax aggressiveness and insider 
trading profitability to diminish after the introduction of FIN 48. To test this conjecture, we create 
an indicator variable that equals one if the firm-year observation is on or after fiscal year 2007 and 
zero otherwise (FIN48), and we interact this variable with our measure of tax aggressiveness. The 
results of this analysis are presented in Table 6. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
As shown in this table, we find that the association between tax aggressiveness and insider 
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purchase profitability weakens significantly after the introduction of FIN 48. We fail to find 
evidence that the association between tax aggressiveness and insider sales profitability is weaker 
in the post-FIN 48 period. The analyses suggest that the increased disclosure of uncertain tax 
positions under the FIN 48 regime increases the transparency of these uncertain tax positions, 
which results in a weaker association between tax aggressiveness and insider trading profitability 
in the post-FIN 48 period. 
6. Conclusion 
Whether managers use tax aggressive activities to opportunistically seek benefits for 
themselves and the mechanisms by which they do so remain unclear in the existing literature 
(Armstrong et al. 2015). We seek to provide evidence on this issue by examining the association 
between corporate tax aggressiveness and insider trading under the assumption that insider trading 
profits reflect managerial opportunism. Using a large sample of firms from fiscal years 1996–2014 
and controlling for factors associated with insider trading, we document that insider trading 
purchase profitability is significantly higher in more tax aggressive firms. This result is consistent 
with increases in financial opacity under tax aggressiveness and insiders exploiting the associated 
information advantage to purchase their company shares and profit from them. We do not find that 
insider trading sales profitability is significantly higher on average in more tax aggressive firms.  
We conduct a series of additional analyses to corroborate our findings and to provide 
additional insights. First, we find that the positive association between tax aggressiveness and 
insider trading profitability is weaker for firms with more effective monitoring (proxied by 
institutional ownership) and is stronger for firms with a more opaque information environment 
(proxied by an opacity index). Second, we document that tax aggressiveness is significantly 
associated with greater insider sales volume in the fiscal year prior to stock price crash, providing 
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evidence that insiders of tax aggressive firms trade opportunistically to avoid losses prior to stock 
price crashes. Finally, we find that the association between tax aggressiveness and insider purchase 
profitability weakens after the introduction of FIN 48.  
To the extent that insider trading profits reflect managerial opportunism, our results are 
consistent with Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) theory of complementarities between tax 
aggressiveness and rent extraction. Our study hence adds to the growing literature that examines 
Desai and Dharmapala’s (2006) theory (e.g., Blaylock 2016; Seidman and Stomberg 2017), which 
is particularly important in light of the substantial number of studies that rely on the agency view 
of tax avoidance to develop their hypotheses. Our findings also contribute to the ongoing debate 
on whether managers benefit from the opacity surrounding tax aggressive activities (e.g., 
Armstrong et al. 2015). Because managers can benefit from self-serving behavior in other ways, 
such as investing in pet projects, engaging in perks consumption, and shirking and slacking on 
performance, future studies can contribute to this debate and explore whether managers benefit 
from tax aggressive activities through these channels.    
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Appendix  
 
Variable Definitions 
 
SALES PROFIT$ = Aggregate profitability of all insider trades from insider sales 
transactions during the fiscal year, computed as follows: 
� (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
× 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴_𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑉𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
where ABRETitj is equal to the one-year ahead buy-and-hold 
size-adjusted return computed for the period starting one day 
after transaction date j, VALUE_SOLDitj equals the total dollar 
value of shares sold by all insiders on day j, and n is the total 
number of firm-days with insider sales activity during firm-
year it. This measure is multiplied by -1 so that losses avoided 
on sales have the same sign as gains on purchases. 
SALES VALUE$ = Total dollar value of shares sold by all insiders during the fiscal 
year. 
SALES FREQ = Number of insider sales transactions during the fiscal year. 
PURCHASE PROFIT$ = Same definition as SALES PROFITS except share purchases 
replaces share sales.  
PURCHASE VALUE$ = Total dollar value of shares purchased by all insiders during the 
fiscal year. 
PURCHASE FREQ = Number of insider purchase transactions during the fiscal year. 
SALE_PROFIT = (SALES PROFIT$)/MVit where MVit-1 is the market value of 
equity at the end of fiscal year t-1.  
PURCH_PROFIT = (PURCHASE PROFIT$)/MVit-1 where MVit-1 is the market 
value of equity at the end of fiscal year t-1. 
SALE_VOL = Log of 1 + Dollar value of shares sold during the fiscal year. 
PURCH_VOL = Log of 1 + Dollar value of shares purchased during the fiscal 
year. 
CETR = An indicator equals one if the firm’s one-year cash effective tax 
rate is in the bottom quintile of the sample population, and zero 
otherwise. Cash effective tax rate is defined as cash taxes paid 
(TXPD) divided by pre-tax income (PI). Following Chen et al. 
(2010), we remove observations with negative pre-tax income, 
and those observations with cash effective tax rates below zero 
or above one.  
TBTD = Total book-tax differences which is computed as TXDI + (STR 
– ETR) × PI, where TXDI refers to deferred tax expense, STR 
refers to the statutory tax rate, ETR refers to the effective tax 
rate (income tax expense divided by pretax income) and PI 
refers to pretax income. This measure is then scaled by lagged 
total assets. 
DTAX = Discretionary component of the permanent book-tax 
differences, as in Frank et al. (2009). 
DDBTD = Desai and Dharmapala (2006) residual book-tax difference.  
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BTDFACTOR = An indicator equals one if the first principal component of the 
following three book-tax difference based measures are in the 
top quintile of the sample distribution of the principal 
component: (1) TBTD, (2) DTAX, and (3) DDBTD,  and zero 
otherwise. 
SHELTER = An indicator equals one if the firm’s tax shelter prediction score 
estimated from the Wilson (2009) model is in the top quintile 
of the sample population, and zero otherwise.. 
LNMV = Natural log of market capitalization at the end of the prior fiscal 
year. 
BTM = Book-to-market ratio at the end of the prior fiscal year, defined 
as book value of equity (CEQ) divided by market value of 
equity (CSHO x PRCC_F). 
PRIOR_RET = Buy-and-hold size-adjusted returns over the one-year period 
ending one day before the first insider trading transaction 
during the fiscal year, set to zero for firm-years without any 
insider trading activity. 
EP = Earnings to price ratio at the end of the prior fiscal year, defined 
as income before extraordinary items (IB) divided by market 
value of equity (CSHO x PRCC_F). 
AVG_GROWTH = Weighted-average sales growth over the past five years, with 
year t-1 having a weight of 5, year t-2 having a weight of four, 
etc. When sales growth is missing for any year during the five-
year period, the variable in that year is set equal to sales growth 
of the prior year. 
AGE = Firm age at the end of the current fiscal year, measured by the 
number of years the company has stock price data on CRSP. 
LOSS = An indicator equals one if the firm reports a negative income 
before extraordinary item (IB) in the prior fiscal year, and zero 
otherwise. 
RND = An indicator variable equals one if the firm reports non-zero 
research and development expenses (XRD) in the current fiscal 
year, and zero otherwise. 
MAG_AR = The median of absolute market reaction to prior quarterly 
earnings announcements, where market reaction is measured as 
the cumulative size-adjusted return from two days before to the 
day of the earnings announcement (Huddart and Ke 2007); the 
median is measure over the 20-quarter period ending with the 
fourth quarter of the current fiscal year. 
ANALYST = Number of analysts following a firm at fiscal year-end. 
IOHOLD = Percentage of institutional ownership at fiscal year-end. 
FSINFORM = Financial statement informativeness computed as the adjusted 
R2 from a firm-specific time-series regression of price per share 
(PRCCQ) on book value per share (CEQQ/CSHOQ) and 
earnings per share (IBQ/CSHOQ) using quarterly data from 
37 
 
Compustat for the 20-quarter period ending with the fourth 
quarter of the current fiscal year. 
RET_VOL = Stock return volatility over the current fiscal year. 
OPACITY = The opacity index in the current fiscal year, following 
Anderson et al. (2009). This index encompasses four individual 
proxies for opacity: (1) trading volume, (2) bid-ask spread, (3) 
analyst following, and (4) analyst forecast errors. The opacity 
of a firm’s information environment is presumed to be 
increasing in its bid-ask spread and analyst forecast errors, and 
decreasing in its trading volume and analyst following. This 
index is derived by ranking each of these proxies into deciles 
of opacity and allocating scores from one (least opaque) to ten 
(most opaque). The opacity index for each firm is then obtained 
by summing the scores across these four proxies and then 
dividing by the maximum possible score of forty such that the 
opacity index ranges from 0.1 to 1.0. 
TURNOVER = Number of shares traded during the fiscal year divided by the 
number of shares outstanding (CSHO) at fiscal year-end. 
RESTRICT = An indicator equals one if 75% or more of insiders’ trades 
during the fiscal year occur in the 30-day window following an 
earnings announcement, and zero otherwise. 
ACCEM = Discretionary accruals at fiscal year-end, based on the cross-
sectional modified Jones (1991) model for all firms in the 
Compustat universe, estimated by 2-digit SIC industry and 
fiscal year. 
ROA = Operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) in the current 
fiscal year scaled by lagged total assets (AT). 
LEVERAGE = Long term debt (DLTT) at the end of the current fiscal year 
scaled by lagged total assets (AT). 
NOL = An indicator equals one if the firm reports a positive tax loss 
carryforward (TLCF) at the beginning of the fiscal year, and 
zero otherwise. 
FI = Foreign pre-tax income (PIFO) in the current fiscal year scaled 
by lagged total assets (AT); set to zero if foreign pre-tax income 
is missing. 
PPE = Net property, plant and equipment (PPENT) at the end of the 
current fiscal year scaled by lagged total assets (AT). 
INTANG = Intangible assets (INTAN) at the end of the current fiscal year 
scaled by lagged total assets (AT); set to zero if intangible 
assets is missing. 
EQINC = An indicator equals one if the firm reports equity in earnings 
(ESUB) that is not zero in the current fiscal year, zero 
otherwise. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample 
Variables Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Q1 Q3 
SALES PROFIT      28,067  -250,459 0 41,647,899 -84,511 371,213 
SALES VALUE      28,067  12,683,109 1,365,274 107,605,818 67,650 7,732,898 
SALES FREQ      28,067  36.230 9.000 183.825 1.000 27.000 
PURCHASE PROFIT      28,067  47,517 0 2,863,888 0 1,514 
PURCHASE VALUE      28,067  592,228 4,874 9,151,970 0 130,000 
PURCHASE FREQ      28,067  4.076 1.000 19.627 0.000 3.000 
SALE_PROFIT      28,067  -0.037 0.000 4.940 -0.007 0.035 
PURCH_PROFIT       28,067  0.016 0.000 0.472 0.000 0.000 
CETR      20,444  0.200 0.000 0.400 0.000 0.000 
BTDFACTOR 27,527 0.200 0.000 0.400 0.000 0.000 
SHELTER      28,067  0.200 0.000 0.400 0.000 0.000 
LNMV      28,067  6.791 6.625 1.721 5.532 7.921 
BTM      28,067  0.507 0.435 0.360 0.260 0.668 
PRIOR_RET      28,067  0.095 0.000 0.548 -0.200 0.250 
EP      28,067  0.017 0.044 0.118 0.012 0.067 
AVG_GROWTH      28,067  0.247 0.119 0.527 0.045 0.248 
AGE      28,067  21.095 15.000 18.049 8.000 29.000 
LOSS      28,067  0.209 0.000 0.407 0.000 0.000 
RND      28,067  0.492 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
MAG_AR      28,067  0.034 0.030 0.017 0.021 0.043 
ANALYST      28,067  7.663 6.000 6.975 2.000 11.000 
IOHOLD      28,067  0.630 0.664 0.248 0.462 0.818 
FSINFORM      28,067  0.385 0.379 0.292 0.138 0.629 
RET_VOL      28,067  0.030 0.027 0.015 0.019 0.038 
OPACITY      28,067  0.393 0.375 0.165 0.275 0.500 
TURNOVER      28,067  2.269 1.711 1.939 0.982 2.898 
RESTRICT      28,067  0.164 0.000 0.370 0.000 0.000 
ACCEM      28,067  -0.005 0.005 0.137 -0.043 0.050 
ROA      28,067  0.128 0.134 0.158 0.077 0.203 
LEVERAGE      28,067  0.206 0.154 0.223 0.009 0.316 
NOL      28,067  0.402 0.000 0.490 0.000 1.000 
FI      28,067  0.015 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.019 
PPE      28,067  0.303 0.211 0.277 0.091 0.434 
INTANG      28,067  0.171 0.086 0.213 0.004 0.263 
EQINC      28,067  0.877 1.000 0.329 1.000 1.000 
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TABLE 1 (Cont’d) 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics Partitioned by Tax Aggressiveness (Means) 
Variables TAX = CETR     TAX = BTDFACTOR     TAX = SHELTER      
TAX = 0 TAX = 1 t-test   TAX = 0 TAX = 1 t-test   TAX = 0 TAX = 1 t-test   
SALES PROFIT -130,580 -2,176,904 -2.42 ** -85,035 -949,771 -1.36   354 -1,254,250 -2.02 ** 
SALES VALUE 14,868,832 19,128,278 1.94 * 11,938,076 16,197,164 2.60 *** 7,272,146 34,338,532 16.94 *** 
SALES FREQ 41.876 44.519 0.74   34.739 42.766 2.88 *** 30.683 58.429 10.13 *** 
PURCHASE PROFIT 11,983 96,467 2.12 ** 38,994 84,745 1.05   43,822 62,304 0.43   
PURCHASE VALUE 525,797 508,175 -0.11   615,372 496,974 -0.85   499,873 961,844 3.38 *** 
PURCHASE FREQ 3.236 3.570 1.36   4.192 3.568 -2.09 ** 4.449 2.584 -6.37 *** 
SALE_PROFIT -0.021 -0.266 -2.48 ** -0.023 -0.098 -0.99   -0.041 -0.024 0.23   
PURCH_PROFIT  0.005 0.034 6.07 *** 0.010 0.043 4.60 *** 0.019 0.005 -1.94 * 
LNMV 7.146 6.676 -15.55 *** 6.785 6.869 3.25 *** 6.271 8.874 127.30 *** 
BTM 0.463 0.503 7.66 *** 0.530 0.418 -20.94 *** 0.532 0.407 -23.49 *** 
PRIOR_RET 0.117 0.221 11.65 *** 0.067 0.204 16.78 *** 0.090 0.116 3.23 *** 
EP 0.052 0.031 -22.17 *** 0.017 0.020 1.60   0.010 0.045 20.06 *** 
AVG_GROWTH 0.160 0.231 18.33 *** 0.242 0.242 -0.09   0.271 0.148 -15.79 *** 
AGE 23.779 18.837 -15.26 *** 21.648 19.095 -9.39 *** 18.161 32.835 57.60 *** 
LOSS 0.055 0.183 27.41 *** 0.212 0.184 -4.58 *** 0.241 0.081 -26.68 *** 
RND 0.447 0.459 1.33   0.489 0.499 1.35   0.464 0.601 18.52 *** 
MAG_AR 0.031 0.035 12.22 *** 0.034 0.035 3.92 *** 0.036 0.027 -31.88 *** 
ANALYST 8.567 7.960 -4.79 *** 7.414 8.850 13.60 *** 6.036 14.176 88.41 *** 
IOHOLD 0.653 0.637 -3.73 *** 0.627 0.652 6.60 *** 0.611 0.706 25.98 *** 
FSINFORM 0.409 0.378 -6.06 *** 0.382 0.403 4.77 *** 0.374 0.433 13.61 *** 
RET_VOL 0.025 0.030 21.69 *** 0.030 0.030 1.26   0.032 0.023 -41.18 *** 
OPACITY 2.033 2.568 17.45 *** 2.182 2.613 14.84 *** 2.240 2.384 4.97 *** 
TURNOVER 0.157 0.153 -0.63   0.166 0.155 -1.96 ** 0.172 0.131 -7.42 *** 
RESTRICT 0.011 0.016 2.62 *** -0.005 -0.005 -0.04   -0.007 0.005 5.90 *** 
ACCEM 0.366 0.386 7.30 *** 0.398 0.373 -9.97 *** 0.426 0.262 -73.01 *** 
ROA 0.187 0.168 -10.82 *** 0.110 0.208 43.12 *** 0.116 0.179 27.06 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.196 0.238 11.50 *** 0.202 0.219 5.10 *** 0.209 0.192 -5.13 *** 
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NOL 0.346 0.458 13.33 *** 0.394 0.439 6.05 *** 0.395 0.431 4.80 *** 
FI 0.023 0.015 -10.65 *** 0.013 0.026 25.19 *** 0.008 0.046 78.35 *** 
PPE 0.301 0.385 17.21 *** 0.278 0.399 29.51 *** 0.306 0.288 -4.39 *** 
INTANG 0.195 0.144 -13.56 *** 0.171 0.169 -0.62   0.166 0.190 7.75 *** 
EQINC 0.858 0.882 3.90 *** 0.875 0.884 1.71 * 0.903 0.774 -26.59 ***              
No. of obs.        16,360          4,084             22,025          5,502             22,456          5,611      
The sample period used for the study spans from 1996-2014. The descriptive statistics for all variables are based on the largest sample when tax aggressiveness is 
measured by SHELTER. The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. 
*, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
41 
 
TABLE 2 
Pearson and Spearman Correlation Table 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 SALE_PROFIT 
 
-0.10 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 PURCH_PROFIT  -0.33 
 
0.04 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.02 
3 CETR -0.02 0.03 
 
0.32 0.04 -0.04 0.07 0.08 -0.13 0.07 -0.05 0.17 0.05 0.06 0.01 
4 BTDFACTOR -0.03 0.04 0.32 
 
0.12 0.02 -0.13 0.10 0.01 0.00 -0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.08 
5 SHELTER -0.07 0.01 0.04 0.12 
 
0.61 -0.14 0.02 0.12 -0.09 0.33 -0.16 0.11 -0.19 0.47 
6 LNMV -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.57 
 
-0.29 0.01 0.21 -0.10 0.45 -0.27 -0.03 -0.35 0.70 
7 BTM -0.06 0.03 0.05 -0.14 -0.15 -0.28 
 
-0.21 -0.08 -0.13 0.02 0.09 -0.22 0.01 -0.23 
8 PRIOR_RET 0.06 -0.04 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.09 -0.23 
 
0.05 0.03 -0.06 -0.04 0.03 0.12 0.01 
9 EP -0.06 0.00 -0.17 -0.01 0.13 0.18 0.19 0.02 
 
-0.15 0.14 -0.69 -0.14 -0.18 0.11 
10 AVG_GROWTH 0.08 -0.02 0.00 0.05 -0.11 -0.11 -0.19 0.00 -0.06 
 
-0.23 0.20 0.08 0.18 -0.03 
11 AGE -0.08 0.01 -0.07 -0.05 0.28 0.39 0.09 0.00 0.23 -0.40 
 
-0.17 0.00 -0.29 0.22 
12 LOSS 0.02 0.02 0.17 -0.03 -0.16 -0.27 0.03 -0.11 -0.70 0.02 -0.19 
 
0.17 0.20 -0.16 
13 RND 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.11 -0.05 -0.24 0.00 -0.24 0.03 -0.02 0.17 
 
0.13 -0.01 
14 MAG_AR 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.03 -0.19 -0.38 -0.03 0.02 -0.21 0.22 -0.32 0.21 0.13 
 
-0.19 
15 ANALYST -0.03 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.41 0.67 -0.25 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.16 -0.17 -0.01 -0.19 
 
16 IOHOLD -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.15 0.40 -0.03 0.08 0.06 -0.10 0.11 -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.33 
17 FSINFORM -0.04 0.02 -0.05 0.03 0.08 0.09 -0.07 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.06 -0.10 0.00 -0.07 0.06 
18 RET_VOL 0.14 -0.02 0.09 0.03 -0.27 -0.49 -0.02 -0.04 -0.33 0.31 -0.43 0.36 0.15 0.54 -0.29 
19 OPACITY 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.42 -0.80 0.30 -0.14 -0.08 0.04 -0.25 0.21 -0.03 0.24 -0.68 
20 TURNOVER 0.10 0.00 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.23 -0.21 0.15 -0.12 0.21 -0.12 0.07 0.10 0.22 0.29 
21 RESTRICT 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.05 
22 ACCEM 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.04 -0.04 -0.05 0.07 0.06 -0.02 0.02 -0.08 0.00 0.02 -0.04 
23 ROA -0.06 0.05 -0.14 0.29 0.17 0.20 -0.34 0.25 0.31 0.06 0.07 -0.44 -0.09 -0.07 0.22 
24 LEVERAGE -0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.22 0.02 -0.01 0.14 -0.06 0.13 -0.07 -0.24 -0.15 0.14 
25 NOL 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.15 -0.03 -0.03 0.15 0.17 0.06 0.01 
26 FI -0.04 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.49 0.30 -0.12 0.08 0.10 -0.13 0.20 -0.17 0.22 -0.12 0.19 
27 PPE -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.13 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.01 0.11 -0.06 0.14 -0.12 -0.25 -0.10 0.09 
28 INTANG -0.02 0.02 -0.07 -0.03 0.09 0.15 -0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.11 0.12 -0.07 0.10 
29 EQINC 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.16 -0.18 -0.01 0.00 -0.07 0.08 -0.11 0.07 0.02 0.11 -0.10 
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TABLE 2 (Cont’d) 
    16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
1 SALE_PROFIT 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
2 PURCH_PROFIT  -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 
3 CETR 0.03 -0.05 0.09 -0.02 0.12 -0.02 0.02 -0.12 0.07 0.13 0.02 0.09 -0.06 0.01 
4 BTDFACTOR 0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.25 0.03 0.04 0.15 0.18 0.00 0.01 
5 SHELTER 0.15 0.08 -0.24 -0.40 0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.16 -0.03 0.03 0.42 -0.03 0.05 -0.16 
6 LNMV 0.37 0.09 -0.43 -0.78 0.13 -0.06 -0.04 0.21 0.11 0.02 0.29 0.09 0.11 -0.19 
7 BTM -0.05 -0.07 0.05 0.31 -0.15 0.04 -0.03 -0.16 -0.07 -0.02 -0.16 0.04 -0.08 -0.01 
8 PRIOR_RET 0.03 0.06 0.08 -0.09 0.24 -0.04 0.06 0.16 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.02 
9 EP 0.09 0.04 -0.34 -0.15 -0.10 -0.03 0.08 0.36 -0.01 -0.12 0.12 0.08 0.06 -0.05 
10 AVG_GROWTH -0.13 -0.04 0.28 0.06 0.17 -0.01 -0.04 -0.25 0.02 0.03 -0.09 -0.03 -0.03 0.05 
11 AGE 0.09 0.04 -0.37 -0.26 -0.13 -0.01 0.01 0.09 0.05 -0.05 0.16 0.12 -0.02 -0.12 
12 LOSS -0.12 -0.10 0.37 0.21 0.09 0.03 -0.09 -0.48 -0.01 0.15 -0.17 -0.10 -0.10 0.07 
13 RND 0.01 -0.01 0.15 -0.03 0.10 -0.01 -0.03 -0.16 -0.20 0.17 0.17 -0.34 0.08 0.02 
14 MAG_AR -0.14 -0.06 0.50 0.22 0.23 0.03 0.00 -0.08 -0.09 0.05 -0.09 -0.12 -0.06 0.10 
15 ANALYST 0.28 0.06 -0.26 -0.63 0.20 -0.06 -0.02 0.19 0.06 0.01 0.22 0.11 0.06 -0.11 
16 IOHOLD 
 
0.04 -0.24 -0.54 0.30 -0.01 -0.05 0.16 0.06 0.10 0.15 -0.06 0.19 0.00 
17 FSINFORM 0.04 
 
-0.10 -0.07 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.12 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 0.00 0.03 -0.01 
18 RET_VOL -0.20 -0.11 
 
0.35 0.36 0.03 -0.06 -0.29 -0.08 0.04 -0.17 -0.12 -0.14 0.11 
19 OPACITY -0.51 -0.07 0.38 
 
-0.49 0.06 0.05 -0.21 -0.05 -0.10 -0.25 -0.02 -0.19 0.09 
20 TURNOVER 0.44 0.00 0.30 -0.37 
 
-0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.05 
21 RESTRICT -0.01 -0.03 0.04 0.06 -0.01 
 
-0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
22 ACCEM -0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.06 -0.01 
 
0.12 -0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
23 ROA 0.12 0.13 -0.22 -0.22 0.04 -0.03 0.08 
 
0.08 -0.13 0.26 0.24 0.14 -0.04 
24 LEVERAGE 0.09 -0.01 -0.18 -0.10 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.09 
 
0.01 -0.05 0.39 0.22 -0.06 
25 NOL 0.11 -0.02 0.04 -0.10 0.14 -0.01 -0.03 -0.12 0.00 
 
0.08 -0.12 0.13 0.04 
26 FI 0.20 0.07 -0.21 -0.28 0.04 -0.01 0.07 0.24 0.00 0.12 
 
-0.04 0.07 -0.06 
27 PPE -0.06 -0.01 -0.12 -0.02 -0.05 0.01 0.01 0.32 0.40 -0.12 -0.04 
 
-0.24 -0.04 
28 INTANG 0.24 0.02 -0.16 -0.22 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.20 -0.22 
 
-0.02 
29 EQINC 0.01 -0.01 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.09 0.04 -0.08 -0.04 -0.03   
This table reports the Pearson (Spearman) correlation between the variables used in the regression analysis in the 
upper (lower) diagonal, based on the largest sample when tax aggressiveness is measured by SHELTER. The detailed 
definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. All correlations (with the exception of those shaded) are 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better (two-tailed) 
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TABLE 3 
Tax Aggressiveness and Profitability of Insider Trades 
  TAX = CETR TAX = BTDFACTOR TAX = SHELTER 
 SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ 
  PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT 
TAX -0.240 0.025*** 0.052 0.027*** -0.133 0.025** 
 (-1.34) (2.69) (0.39) (3.42) (-1.40) (2.15) 
LNMV 0.062** -0.006 0.093* -0.015 0.109* -0.020* 
 (2.18) (-1.30) (1.75) (-1.64) (1.83) (-1.85) 
BTM -0.527 0.025** -0.052 0.007 -0.044 0.003 
 (-1.55) (2.11) (-1.28) (0.57) (-1.09) (0.24) 
PRIOR_RET 0.314 -0.020** 0.255 -0.028*** 0.256 -0.027*** 
 (0.96) (-2.02) (1.20) (-2.89) (1.21) (-2.91) 
EP 1.608 -0.161 0.250 -0.027 0.226 -0.026 
 (0.95) (-1.61) (1.05) (-0.56) (0.98) (-0.55) 
AVG_GROWTH -0.181* -0.021 -0.087* 0.006 -0.084* 0.005 
 (-1.82) (-1.55) (-1.92) (0.51) (-1.92) (0.48) 
AGE 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.85) (0.30) (0.86) (1.14) (1.00) (0.96) 
LOSS 0.149 0.002 -0.105** 0.027** -0.103** 0.028** 
 (0.58) (0.21) (-2.40) (2.00) (-2.42) (2.10) 
RND -0.086 0.011** -0.069 0.006 -0.059 0.006 
 (-1.39) (2.19) (-1.11) (0.96) (-1.03) (0.83) 
MAG_AR 1.835 -0.054 2.254 0.111 2.240 0.090 
 (0.69) (-0.26) (1.12) (0.56) (1.12) (0.47) 
ANALYST -0.003 -0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.004 -0.000 
 (-0.88) (-0.37) (-1.61) (0.08) (-1.49) (-0.11) 
IOHOLD 0.479 -0.037*** 0.356 -0.044** 0.337 -0.041** 
 (0.74) (-2.58) (0.89) (-2.36) (0.88) (-2.29) 
FSINFORM -0.294 0.019* -0.213 0.016* -0.207 0.016* 
 (-1.36) (1.66) (-1.27) (1.73) (-1.30) (1.78) 
RET_VOL 7.399 0.209 6.209 0.735* 6.268 0.722* 
 (1.45) (0.44) (1.52) (1.79) (1.53) (1.86) 
OPACITY 0.012 -0.009 0.031 -0.097 0.088 -0.106 
 (0.03) (-0.39) (0.09) (-1.45) (0.26) (-1.55) 
TURNOVER -0.112 0.007 -0.087 0.001 -0.085 0.001 
 (-0.70) (1.59) (-0.75) (0.38) (-0.74) (0.53) 
RESTRICT 0.068 -0.006 0.079 -0.005 0.080 -0.004 
 (1.40) (-1.55) (1.58) (-0.54) (1.52) (-0.51) 
ACCEM 0.358** 0.019 0.112 0.023 0.136 0.017 
 (2.49) (0.66) (0.62) (0.86) (0.77) (0.63) 
ROA -2.684 0.099*** -1.220 0.119*** -1.154* 0.135*** 
 (-1.55) (2.77) (-1.63) (5.79) (-1.75) (5.97) 
LEVERAGE 0.121 0.028** 0.171 0.010 0.156 0.012 
 (0.55) (2.30) (0.98) (0.39) (0.99) (0.51) 
NOL 0.010 -0.014* -0.013 0.003 -0.008 0.003 
 (0.27) (-1.94) (-0.45) (0.35) (-0.27) (0.40) 
FI -0.280 0.040 -0.400 0.028 0.038 -0.009 
 (-0.40) (0.52) (-0.55) (0.36) (0.07) (-0.13) 
PPE -0.155 -0.023** -0.298 -0.006 -0.278 -0.001 
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 (-0.92) (-2.16) (-1.24) (-0.27) (-1.31) (-0.04) 
INTANG -0.080 -0.018 -0.014 -0.023 -0.003 -0.022 
 (-0.31) (-1.45) (-0.08) (-1.06) (-0.02) (-1.05) 
EQINC 0.056 -0.002 0.039 -0.005 0.033 -0.004 
 (0.90) (-0.73) (0.90) (-0.91) (0.84) (-0.76) 
Constant 0.109 0.035 -0.714* 0.126 -0.581** 0.159** 
 (0.18) (0.98) (-1.71) (1.49) (-2.46) (1.98) 
       
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 20,444 20,444 27,527 27,527 28,067 28,067 
Adjusted R2 0.018 0.009 0.013 0.004 0.012 0.004 
This table reports the regression results of the relation between tax aggressiveness and the profitability of insider 
trades. The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses 
below the coefficient estimates. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year to correct for time-series and cross-
sectional dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01, respectively (two-tailed test).  
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TABLE 4 
Tax Aggressiveness and Profitability of Insider Trades – Cross-Sectional Analyses 
Panel A:  The Role of Monitoring 
  TAX = CETR TAX = BTDFACTOR TAX = SHELTER 
 SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ 
  PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT 
TAX -0.213 0.025*** 0.039 0.029*** -0.137 0.028** 
 (-1.40) (2.78) (0.29) (3.48) (-1.39) (1.99) 
TAX × IOHOLD 1.511 -0.073** -0.651 -0.107** 0.660 -0.122** 
 (1.10) (-2.47) (-0.67) (-2.27) (0.94) (-2.25) 
IOHOLD -6.908 -0.015 -0.931 -0.347 -0.674 -0.446 
 (-0.95) (-0.09) (-0.51) (-1.18) (-0.43) (-1.54) 
Constant 0.192 0.017 -0.730* 0.120 -0.580** 0.141* 
 (0.26) (0.53) (-1.77) (1.47) (-2.14) (1.91) 
       
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
CONTROLS × IOHOLD YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 20,444 20,444 27,527 27,527 28,067 28,067 
Adjusted R2 0.028 0.012 0.018 0.007 0.017 0.006 
Panel B: The Role of Opaque Information Environment 
  TAX = CETR TAX = BTDFACTOR TAX = SHELTER 
 SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ 
  PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT 
TAX -0.218 0.024*** 0.048 0.029*** -0.101 0.028* 
 (-1.36) (2.71) (0.35) (3.49) (-1.64) (1.91) 
TAX × OPACITY -1.251 0.108*** 0.542 0.167*** -0.433 0.084 
 (-1.00) (3.31) (0.68) (3.77) (-0.95) (1.35) 
OPACITY 0.515 0.072 -2.138 -0.074 -2.064 -0.040 
 (0.46) (0.45) (-0.78) (-0.50) (-0.77) (-0.28) 
Constant -0.142 0.046 -0.752 0.083 -0.794*** 0.121* 
 (-0.52) (1.53) (-1.47) (1.25) (-2.62) (1.88) 
       
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
CONTROLS × OPACITY YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 20,444 20,444 27,527 27,527 28,067 28,067 
Adjusted R2 0.023 0.016 0.016 0.005 0.015 0.005 
This table reports the regression results of the role of moderating (conditioning) variables on the relation between tax 
aggressiveness and the profitability of insider trades. We mean-center the conditioning variable (IOHOLD) in the 
regression analysis to mitigate multicollinearity problem. The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the 
Appendix. T-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Standard errors are clustered by 
firm and year to correct for time-series and cross-sectional dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). In Panel A 
the moderating variable is institutional ownership. In Panel B the moderating variable is the opacity index (Anderson 
et al. 2009). *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed test). 
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TABLE 5 
Tax Aggressiveness and Timing of Insider Trades – Prior to Stock Price Crashes 
  TAX = CETR TAX = BTDFACTOR TAX = SHELTER 
 SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ 
  VOL VOL VOL VOL VOL VOL 
TAX -0.026 0.059 0.164*** -0.004 0.256** -0.026 
 (-0.22) (0.85) (2.76) (-0.07) (2.16) (-0.32) 
Constant 1.044 -0.499 1.660*** -0.708** 7.727*** -1.942*** 
 (1.59) (-1.07) (2.67) (-2.01) (14.17) (-4.05) 
       
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4,622 4,622 6,019 6,019 6,139 6,139 
Adjusted R2 0.357 0.059 0.390 0.062 0.391 0.063 
This table reports the regression results of the relation between tax aggressiveness and the intensity of insider trading 
during the fiscal year before stock price crashes. The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. 
T-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year 
to correct for time-series and cross-sectional dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). *, **, and *** represent 
significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed test). 
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TABLE 6 
Tax Aggressiveness and Timing of Insider Trades – Post FIN 48 Period 
  TAX = CETR TAX = BTDFACTOR TAX = SHELTER 
 SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ SALE_ PURCH_ 
  PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT PROFIT 
TAX -0.389 0.040*** 0.067 0.044*** -0.202 0.037** 
 (-1.24) (3.12) (0.33) (3.87) (-1.40) (2.50) 
TAX × FIN48 0.384 -0.036*** -0.068 -0.040*** 0.174 -0.037** 
 (1.07) (-2.83) (-0.34) (-2.63) (1.27) (-2.21) 
FIN48 -0.328 -0.000 0.732*** -0.141 0.848*** -0.174 
 (-0.48) (-0.00) (2.69) (-1.02) (2.81) (-1.21) 
Constant 0.114 0.031 -0.837** 0.209 -0.992*** 0.241* 
 (0.17) (0.57) (-2.56) (1.45) (-4.04) (1.68) 
       
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
CONTROLS × FIN48 YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 20,444 20,444 27,527 27,527 28,067 28,067 
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.013 0.014 0.006 0.014 0.005 
This table reports the regression results of the effect of FIN 48 on the relation between tax aggressiveness and the 
profitability of insider trades. The detailed definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year to correct for 
time-series and cross-sectional dependence (Petersen 2009; Gow et al. 2010). *, **, and *** represent significance 
levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
 
